We study feasible sets of the bargaining problem under two different assumptions: the players are subjective expected utility maximizers or the players are Choquet expected utility maximizers. For the latter case, we consider the effects on bargaining solutions when players become more risk averse and when they become more uncertainty averse.
Introduction
In the classical bargaining problem of Nash (1950) a number of bargainers face the task of finding a unanimous agreement over the expected utility allocations resulting from the lotteries, i.e. finite probability distributions, over a set of alternatives. In this paper we extend the bargaining problem by adopting the Savage (1954) framework of decision making under uncertainty. We study the consequences for the feasible set of a bargaining problem under two different assumptions about the way bargainers make decisions: as subjective expected utility maximizers or as Choquet expected utility maximizers. In the latter case, the preferences of a bargainer are characterized by a utility function for riskless alternatives and lotteries, and a capacity (non-additive probability measure) for uncertain states of the world. Thus, the attitude of a bargainer towards risk can be strictly separated from his attitude towards uncertainty, and we use this feature to derive results about the effects of comparative risk aversion and comparative uncertainty aversion on the outcomes assigned by specific (namely, monotonic) bargaining solutions.
1
The applications that we have in mind concern bargaining situations where the agreement that the parties reach may be contingent on the future state of the world that will materialize. For instance, the wages and labor conditions in an agreement in the traditional bargaining problem between an employer and a labor union may be made dependent on the future state of the economy.
Related literature
Most closely related to the present work is Köbberling and Peters (2003) . In that paper, the bargaining problem is extended by assuming that probabilities in lotteries may be transformed by a probability weighting function, and overall utilities are rank dependent (Quiggin, 1982) . The paper distinguishes between (comparative) utility risk aversion as expressed by concavity of the utility function for lotteries and (comparative) probabilistic risk aversion as expressed by convexity of the probability weighting function. The effects of these attitudes on bargaining solutions are in line with what we find in the present paper.
There are several papers, notably Safra and Zilcha (1993) , Volij and Winter (2002) , and Rubinstein et al (1992) , which study the qualitative predictions of the Nash bargaining solution beyond the expected utility framework. Roth and Rothblum (1982) 1 show that under the Nash bargaining solution, it is disadvantageous to play against a more risk averse opponent, even in the case of risky outcomes, provided that lotteries only attach positive probabilities to alternatives that are preferred over the riskless disagreement alternative. Safra and Zilcha (1993) show that this result breaks down if the expected utility assumption is abandoned. This is confirmed by results in the present paper (see Example 5.7). Volij and Winter (2002) show that increased risk aversion of one bargainer is beneficial for that bargainer and hurts his opponent, given that both bargainers are risk loving (so that the outcome is a lottery) in a model adopting Yaari's (1987) dual theory of choice under risk. On the other hand, Rubinstein et al (1992) find that under their extension of the Nash bargaining solution it is disadvantageous for a bargainer to be more risk averse, a result which is not confirmed in our framework (see again Example 5.7). A prudent conclusion that may be drawn from all these results is that the Nash bargaining solution behaves irregularly under changes in risk attitudes, and that in this respect it is also sensitive to the way in which risk and uncertainty are modelled beyond the expected utility assumption. As will appear again in the present paper (but for instance also in Zilcha, 1993, or Köbberling and Peters, 2003) bargaining solutions that are monotonic tend to behave much more regularly under changes in attitude towards risk and uncertainty. Examples of such solutions are the Kalai-Smorodinsky (Raiffa, 1953; Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975) and egalitarian (Kalai, 1977) solutions.
This paper
The set of riskless alternatives in this paper is the set of all divisions of one unit of a perfectly divisible good among n bargainers or players. Each player has a strictly increasing and concave utility function which depends only on the own share of the good. Lotteries over riskless alternatives are included as well, and under certainty the utility of a lottery is its expected utility. Further, a finite set of states of the world is assumed.
In Section 3 we follow Savage (1954) and assume that each player attaches subjective utilities to the states of the world. An act assigns to each state of the world a riskless alternative or lottery. We show that the feasible set resulting from considering all possible acts is comprehensive, compact and convex, and strictly comprehensive if each player attaches positive probability to each state of the world.
The results in Section 3 form the basis for those in Section 4, where we assume that the players' probability assessments over the states of the world can be non-additive, and are described by capacities; players are then assumed to be Choquet expected utility maximizers (Schmeidler, 1986 (Schmeidler, , 1989 . We show that in this case the feasible set is convex if the capacities are convex. Moreover, we define and characterize increased uncertainty aversion in terms of capacities and increased risk aversion in terms of the utility functions for lotteries.
In Section 5, we show that for a monotonic bargaining solution, increased uncertainty aversion of a player is disadvantageous for the opponents, whereas increased risk aversion is advantageous for the opponents. We also show that a more uncertainty averse player prefers his allocation to the one obtained by his less uncertainty averse alter ego; whereas a less risk averse player prefers his allocation to the one obtained by his more risk averse alter ego. For nonmonotonic bargaining solutions these results may break down, as we show by examples for the Nash bargaining solution.
Section 6 concludes.
Preliminaries
Following Savage (1954) , the analytical framework of decision making under uncertainty involves a set of states of the world, a set of consequences, and a set of acts -i.e., functions that map states of the world to consequences. Resolution of uncertainty reveals the unique true state of the world, and thus, given an act, provides a decision maker with certainty about the realized consequence.
The situation under consideration in this paper is one with multiple decision makers, or players. Specifically, the player set is N = {1, . . . , n} where n ∈ N, n > 1. The set of states of the world is Ω = {1, . . . , K} where K ∈ N, K > 1. The set of consequences is the set of (simple) lotteries -probability distributions with finite support -on the set
of all possible divisions of one unit of a perfectly divisible good among the n players; 2 more formally, the set of consequences is:
Every lottery ∈ L induces a probability distribution with finite support over player i 's consumption space and, hence, induces a simple lottery l i (·; ) :
for every share x i ∈ [0, 1] of the good. An act is a map f assigning to every k ∈ Ω an element of A or a lottery ∈ L. The set of all acts is denoted by F .
Player i's preferences over acts F are represented by a (reflexive) complete and transitive binary relation i ⊆ F × F . As usual, we write f i g instead of (f, g) ∈ i . For each player i, a function U i , mapping acts into the reals, represents i's preferences i over F if for all f, g ∈ F , we have U i (f ) ≥ U i (g) if and only if f i g. In this paper, we consider different specifications of the functions U i , and for these specifications examine the properties of the set
For the sake of brevity, we write U (f ) ≡ (U 1 (f ), . . . , U n (f )) for every f ∈ F .
Subjective Expected Utility
In this section, the players in N are assumed to be Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) maximizers (Savage, 1954) . The premise of the SEU model is that each player i evaluates an act f ∈ F based on his subjective belief about the states of the world. Specifically, player i's evaluation of an act f ∈ F is given by
where π i : 2 Ω → [0, 1] represents his subjective probability distribution over the state space Ω, 3 and the continuous, strictly increasing, and concave function u i : [0, 1] → R is player i's expected utility function for lotteries: if f (k) is a lottery then with some abuse of notation u i (f i (k)) denotes player i's expected utility for the lottery f i (k) = l i (·; f (k)) resulting from f (k). Since the representation of a player's preference is unique up to positive linear transformations, we may assume without loss of generality that u i (0) = 0 and u i (1) = 1 for every i ∈ N .
2 Here, R n + = {x ∈ R n | x ≥ 0}. We use the following vector inequalities: for all x, y ∈ R n , x ≥ y if x i ≥ y i for each i, x > y if x ≥ y and x = y, and x y if x i > y i for each i. 3 More precisely, π i is a probability measure: (i) π i (∅) = 0 and π i (Ω) = 1; (ii) for all E ⊆ Ω,
For the sake of brevity, we denote u(a) = (u 1 (a 1 ), . . . , u n (a n )) for every a ∈ A. The setŜ = {u(a) | a ∈ A} contains all possible utility evaluations attainable in any one state of the world k ∈ Ω.
4 SinceŜ does not depend on the realized state of the world, it is immediate that S =Ŝ whenever players' beliefs about the realization of those states coincide. More generally,Ŝ is a subset of S. To see this, observe that for any u(a) ∈Ŝ, the act f with f (k) = a for all states k satisfies U (f ) = u(a).
The setŜ satisfies a number of appealing properties: it is non-empty, compact, convex, and strictly comprehensive.
5 We omit the obvious proof of this but, in what follows, we verify which of these properties carry over when uncertainty is introduced.
Proposition 3.1 Under SEU, the set S is comprehensive.
Proof. Let x ∈ S, and let y ∈ R n be such that 0 ≤ y ≤ x. It is sufficient to show that y ∈ S.
By definition of S, there is an f ∈ F such that U (f ) = x. Since each u i is strictly increasing, the inverse function
for all i and k, and each v i is strictly increasing, it follows that
which by comprehensiveness of A implies that g(k) ∈ A for each k ∈ Ω. Hence, g ∈ F , and thus by the definition of S, U (g) ∈ S. Observe that for all i ∈ N ,
The set S is not necessarily strictly comprehensive. For instance, suppose that n = K = 2. Assume that each player i has a linear utility function u i on the interval [0, 1], and consider subjective beliefs π 1 and π 2 with π 1 (1) = 1 and 4 Due to concavity of the utility functions we do not need to include lotteries in the definition ofŜ. In fact, in this paper lotteries merely play an (only) implicit motivational role later on when we define the concept of comparative risk aversion. See also Section 6 about generalizing the set of consequences.
5 A set T ⊆ R n is said to be comprehensive if x ∈ T and 0 ≤ y ≤ x together imply y ∈ T . The set T is strictly comprehensive if in addition, y = x implies the existence of z ∈ T with z y.
π 2 (1) = π 2 (2) = 0.5. Then the set S is equal to the convex polytope in R 2 with vertices at (1, 0), (1, 0.5), (0, 1) and (0, 0), which is not strictly comprehensive.
The following proposition says that the set S is strictly comprehensive if the subjective probability distribution of each player has full support.
Proposition 3.2 Under SEU, let π i (k) > 0 for each i ∈ N and k ∈ Ω. Then S is strictly comprehensive.
Proof. Let x ∈ S and y ∈ R n + with x > y. Then by Proposition 3.1, y ∈ S. The aim is to show that there exists a z ∈ S with z y. Let i ∈ N with x i > y i . By definition of S, there are acts f and g such that U (f ) = x and U (g) = y.
, and define a ∈ R n with
Note that by construction, a g(k * ), and thus, u(a) u(g(k * )). Now construct the act h as follows:
For all j ∈ N we have
where the inequality follows from the full support assumption. Hence, for z = U (h) we have z ∈ S and z y, as desired.
Proposition 3.3 Under SEU, the set S is compact and convex.
Proof. Since S is the image of the compact set F under the continuous function U , it is compact. To show that S is convex, let x, y ∈ S and λ ∈ [0, 1]. We show that λx + (1 − λ)y ∈ S. By definition, there are acts f and g such that x = U (f ) and
is an element of C, and thus, λf
Since S is comprehensive by Proposition 3.1, we conclude that λx + (1 − λ)y ∈ S, as desired.
It was pointed out earlier that S containsŜ, and that S =Ŝ whenever players agree on a single subjective probability distribution π over the state space. It turns out that the converse is true as well: if S =Ŝ, then players' subjective beliefs coincide. For any T ⊆ R n , the Pareto optimal set P (T ) is defined by P (T ) = {t ∈ T | there exists no v ∈ T with v > t}.
Proposition 3.4 Under SEU,Ŝ = S if and only if
Proof. We still have to show the only-if part. Suppose, for contradiction, that (say) π 1 (k * ) = p > q = π 2 (k * ) for some k * ∈ Ω. Let z be a utility allocation in the relative interior of the Pareto set ofŜ. By the supporting hyperplane theorem there is a hyperplane
that supportsŜ at the point z. By strict comprehensiveness ofŜ, λ j > 0 for all j = 1, . . . , n. Define the function ψ :
Note that ψ is well-defined sinceŜ is a compact set. Let x 1 = z 1 + ε for some ε > 0, and
SinceŜ is convex and strictly comprehensive, ψ is strictly decreasing and concave. Therefore, ψ is differentiable from the right at the point z 1 . In particular, lim h↓0 (ψ(z 1 + h) − ψ(z 1 ))/h = −λ 1 /λ 2 . Since p > q it follows that for ε small enough, ψ(z 1 + ε) − ψ(z 1 )/ε > −λ 1 p/λ 2 q, which implies n j=1 λ j U j (f ) > c, and thus again the contradiction U (f ) / ∈Ŝ. This concludes the proof.
The results of this section form the basis for those in the next one, where we consider Choquet expected utility.
Non-Additive Probabilities
Motivated by criticisms on the Savage framework (e.g., Ellsberg, 1961) , Schmeidler (1989) introduced a generalization of Subjective Expected Utility, which assumes that the probabilities agents attach to the occurrence of events need not be additive. At the basis of this model is the concept of a capacity. 
Rather than by a subjective probability measure over the state space, it is now assumed that each player i's beliefs are represented by a capacity µ i . Acts are evaluated by means of the Choquet integral.
Definition 4.2 For all vectors
where τ is a permutation of Ω such that
Player i endowed with capacity µ i and utility u i is a CEU maximizer 6 if his evaluation of the act f is
As before, we are interested in the properties of the set S = {(U i (f ; u i , µ i )) i∈N | f ∈ F }. Note that if a player's capacity is additive, he is an SEU maximizer. Therefore, the results in the previous section are a special case of those obtained here.
Definition 4.3 For all f, g ∈ F and i ∈ N with utility function u i , f and g are comonotonic for i if there are no states k, l ∈ Ω such that
The set of all comonotonic acts for player i is called a comoncone for i.
Each player i evaluates an act f as k∈Ω w k u i (f i (k)) where each w k is of the form [µ i (E ∪ {k}) − µ i (E)] with E ∈ 2 Ω , and k∈Ω w k = µ i (Ω) − µ i (∅) = 1. It is easily seen from the definition that the weights used in the evaluation of two comonotonic acts, coincide. Thus, for all acts in the same comoncone the weights assigned to different states remain unchanged. Since w ≥ 0 and k w k = 1, these weights -for all intents and purposes -may be interpreted as a player's subjective probabilities. This means that our results on F under the assumption of SEU, also hold for the intersections of players' comoncones in F under the assumption of non-additive beliefs. Let u = (u 1 , ..., u n ) and µ = (µ 1 , ..., µ n ) and let g ∈ F . Let T = {U (f ; u, µ) | f is comonotonic with g for every i ∈ N }, where U (f ; u, µ) = (U i (f ; u i , µ i )) i∈N .
Then, since any constant act is comonotonic with g for every i ∈ N , the set T trivially containsŜ. Furthermore, by the same arguments as in Proposition 3.1 and Proposition 3.3 it follows that T is comprehensive, compact and convex. Also strict comprehensiveness can be obtained by the following condition on players' capacities.
Definition 4.4 A capacity µ is strictly monotonic if for all E,E ∈ 2 Ω , E E implies µ(E) < µ(E ).
If a player's capacity is strictly monotonic, then he attaches a strictly positive weight w k > 0 to each state k ∈ Ω. Hence, if all players' capacities are strictly monotonic, then by the same argument as in Proposition 3.2, we have that T is strictly comprehensive.
Since F is the union of finitely many (namely, less than (K!) n ) intersections of players' comoncones, it follows that S is the union of finitely many compact, convex, and comprehensive sets. In addition, if all capacities are strictly monotonic, then the comprehensiveness is strict. Since compactness, comprehensiveness and strict comprehensiveness, are all preserved under finite union, the following obtains as a corollary from the results in the previous section.
Corollary 4.5 Under CEU, the set S is compact and comprehensive. Furthermore, it is strictly comprehensive if players' capacities are strictly monotonic.
Convexity is not preserved under finite union. Indeed, the set S need not be convex, as the following example shows.
Example 4.6 Let n = K = 2, and let the players have linear utilities. Assume that (µ 1 (1), µ 1 (2)) = (µ 2 (1), µ 2 (2)) = (0.9, 0.5). Then S = S 1 ∪ S 2 , where S 1 = conv{(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (0.9, 0.5)} and S 2 = conv{(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (0.5, 0.9)}.
Nontrivial convex combinations of (0.9, 0.5) and (0.5, 0.9) are not contained in S.
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However, it turns out that convexity of players' capacities is a sufficient condition for convexity of S.
Definition 4.8 The core of a capacity µ is the set core(µ) = {π | π is a probability measure s.t. π(E) ≥ µ(E) for all E ⊆ Ω}.
Thus, the core of a capacity consists of all probability measures dominating the capacity values. It is well-known that the core of a convex capacity is nonempty. Schmeidler (1986) shows the following result.
Lemma 4.9 The following statements are equivalent.
(i) The capacity µ is convex.
Schmeidler subsequently showed that, for a convex capacity µ, C µ (x + y) ≥ C µ (x) + C µ (y) for any two x, y ∈ R K . A similar argument is used in the proof of the following proposition.
Proposition 4.10 Assume CEU and suppose that µ i is convex for each i ∈ N . Then the set S is convex.
Proof. Let x, y ∈ S and λ ∈ [0, 1]. We show λx + (1 − λ)y ∈ S. By definition, there are acts f and g such that x = U (f ; u, µ) and y = U (g; u, µ).
Since x, y ∈ S ⊆ R n + , the first inequality is trivially satisfied. To establish the second inequality, consider any player i. Since the capacity µ i is convex, it follows from Lemma 4.9 that there is a π ∈ core(µ i ) such that
where (3) follows from concavity of u i and (4) again from Lemma 4.9. Now (2) follows.
Convexity of players' capacities is a sufficient condition for convexity of S, but it is not a necessary condition, as is demonstrated by the following example.
Example 4.11 Let n = K = 2, and let the players have linear utilities. Assume that (µ 1 (1), µ 1 (2)) = (µ 2 (2), µ 2 (1)) = (3/4, 3/5). Since 3/4 + 3/5 > 1, both players' capacities violate convexity. However, S = conv{(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (3/4, 3/4)}, which is convex.
The remainder of this section is devoted to the concepts of comparative uncertainty and risk aversion and the consequences for the feasible set S. Schmeidler (1989) introduces a concept of uncertainty aversion in the CEU framework and shows that it is equivalent to convexity of the capacity. In our model we are interested in comparative uncertainty aversion. The next definition coincides with the definition of comparative ambiguity aversion in Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) , applied to our framework.
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Definition 4.12 Suppose that player i's preferences over A are represented by the utility function u i . (Player i endowed with) capacity µ i is more uncertainty averse than (player i endowed with) capacity µ i if
The interpretation of this definition is that if a more uncertainty averse player (or decision maker) prefers an (uncertain) act over a sure payoff then so does the less uncertainty averse player. Note that in Definition 4.12 we could just as well write 'η' instead of 'u i (η)', but the present definition shows more clearly the contrast with the definition of comparative risk aversion (Definition 4.14 below).
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The next proposition provides a characterization of the notion of comparative uncertainty aversion in terms of a simple relation between the capacities. This also follows from Theorem 17(i) in Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002), but we include the simple proof both for completeness and because of the intuition it provides, as follows. Consider a CEU maximizer i with convex capacity µ i , who has an alter ego endowed with the more uncertainty averse convex capacity µ i but the same expected utility function for simple lotteries in L. By exploiting binary acts -acts f with f (k) = α if state k is in an event E ∈ 2 Ω and f (k) = β if not -one can show using the definition of comparative uncertainty aversion that i's alter ego attaches a lower mass to each event than i himself. That is, µ i (E) ≤ µ i (E) for all E ∈ 2 Ω . From the definition of the core, it is then immediate that the core of the capacity µ i is a subset of the core of the capacity µ i . Conversely, suppose i and his alter ego are endowed with the same expected utility function but different capacities µ i and µ i such that µ i (E) ≤ µ i (E) for every event E, and hence the core of µ i is contained in the core of µ. Since a generic CEU maximizer evaluates each act f using the subjective beliefs in the core of his capacity that minimize his subjective expected utility of f , this implies that i's alter ego attaches a lower Choquet expected utility to any act f than i himself does. Thus, if i's alter ego prefers an act f to an uncertainty-free act η, so does i, hence µ i is more uncertainty averse than µ i . Proposition 4.13 Let i ∈ N and let µ i and µ i be convex capacities. The following statements are equivalent.
(ii) core (µ i ) ⊆ core (µ i ).
(iii) µ i is more uncertainty averse than µ i .
Proof. The implication (i) ⇒ (ii) is immediate. Now assume (ii); we show (iii). For any f ∈ F , (ii) and Lemma 4.9 imply
Finally, assume (iii); we show (i). Let E ∈ 2 Ω , and consider an act f with
∈ E, where α and β are such that u i (α) > u i (β). By (iii), it follows that for every η ∈ [0, 1] with
In the present framework, the definition of comparative risk aversion is as follows.
Definition 4.14 Suppose that player i is endowed with capacity µ i . (Player i endowed with) utility function u i is more risk averse than (player i endowed with) utility function u i if
Comparative risk aversion can be characterized as follows.
Proposition 4.15 Suppose that player i is endowed with capacity µ i . The following two statements are equivalent.
(i) u i is more risk averse than u i .
(ii) There exists a continuous, strictly increasing and concave function v :
Proof. The implication (i) ⇒ (ii) follows from Yaari (1969) by considering constant acts. Now assume that (ii) holds and let f ∈ F and η ∈ [0, 1] such that
) for some probability measure π. Then by concavity of v,
Since v is strictly increasing, this implies U i (f ; u i , µ i ) ≥ u i (η). Thus, (i) follows.
Bargaining
Assuming that players are CEU maximizers and with notations as in the preceding sections, the set S can be regarded as the feasible set of a bargaining problem with uncertainty. In this context we also write
instead of simply S. Throughout, capacities are assumed to be convex, so that by Proposition 4.10 the set B(u, µ) is convex. We adopt the 'welfaristic approach', which means that a bargaining solution depends exclusively on the feasible set; in other words, if B(u, µ) = B(u , µ ) for some utility-capacity profiles (u, µ) and (u , µ ), then a bargaining solution assigns the same point to both bargaining problems. Formally, let
A bargaining solution is a map ϕ : B → R n such that ϕ(S) ∈ S for every S ∈ B. In this section we collect some interesting observations about the effects of increased uncertainty or risk aversion on bargaining solutions.
A possibly plausible condition on a bargaining solution is the following.
Definition 5.1 A bargaining solution ϕ is monotonic if ϕ(S) ≥ ϕ(S ) for all S, S ∈ B with S ⊆ S.
Well-known bargaining solutions satisfying this condition are the KalaiSmorodinsky solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975) and the proportional bargaining solutions (Kalai, 1977) . Our first result is as follows.
Proposition 5.2 Let ϕ be a monotonic bargaining solution, and let B(u, µ) ∈ B.
(i) Let i ∈ N and B(u, µ ) ∈ B such that µ j = µ j for all j ∈ N \ {i} whereas µ i is more uncertainty averse than µ i . Then ϕ j (B(u, µ )) ≤ ϕ j (B(u, µ)) for all j ∈ N \ {i}.
(ii) Let i ∈ N and B(u , µ) ∈ B such that u j = u j for all j ∈ N \ {i} whereas u i is more risk averse than
Proof. For Proposition 5.2 implies that if a player becomes more uncertainty averse then this is disadvantageous for the other players, but if a player becomes more risk averse then this is advantageous for his opponents. The latter is driven by the fact that a more risk averse player has a more concave utility function.
At lower levels, the utility of such a player increases more for any small increment in the underlying good, which means that satisfaction may appear faster, and thus that opponents do not have to concede as much to reach a compromise. On the other hand, if a player becomes more uncertainty averse, then by Lemma 4.9 and part (ii) of Proposition 4.13, satisfaction is slower to appear, and that player must accordingly be given more of the underlying good to reach a compromise. Note that from the proof of the proposition it follows that also the more uncertainty (risk) averse player has lower (higher) Choquet expected utility, but such comparisons are meaningless since we are dealing with different players. However, for the player who is replaced by a more uncertainty averse or more risk averse person we have the observations in Proposition 5.4 below.
Definition 5.3 A bargaining solution ϕ is weakly Pareto optimal if for all S ∈ B and x ∈ S, x ϕ(S).
Proposition 5.4 Let ϕ be a monotonic and weakly Pareto optimal bargaining solution, and let B(u, µ) ∈ B such that µ j is strictly monotonic for every j ∈ N .
(i) Let i ∈ N and B(u, µ ) ∈ B such that µ j = µ j for all j ∈ N \ {i}, µ i is strictly monotonic, and µ i is more uncertainty averse than
(ii) Let i ∈ N and B(u , µ) ∈ B such that u j = u j for all j ∈ N \ {i} and u i is more risk averse than
Proof. We prove (i), the proof of (ii) is analogous. By Proposition 5.2 we have U j (f ; u j , µ j ) ≤ U j (f ; u j , µ j ) = U j (f ; u j , µ j ) for all j ∈ N \ {i}. By weak Pareto optimality of ϕ and strict comprehensiveness of B(u, µ ) this implies
Proposition 5.4 says that a more uncertainty averse player prefers any act giving rise to the bargaining solution outcome in his bargaining problem to any act giving rise to the bargaining solution outcome in the problem with his less uncertainty averse substitute. In contrast, a less risk averse player prefers any act giving rise to the bargaining solution outcome in his bargaining problem to any act giving rise to the bargaining solution outcome in the problem for his more risk averse substitute -of course, under the conditions in the proposition. The intuition for these results is similar to the intuition for Proposition 5.2. Combining both propositions, and under the conditions in these propositions, we may say that a player who becomes more uncertainty averse hurts his opponents and does not prefer any act obtained in the solution to the original bargaining problem; and a player who becomes less risk averse hurts his opponents and does not prefer any act obtained in the solution to the original bargaining problem.
The following examples show that Propositions 5.2 and 5.4 do not hold for a non-monotonic bargaining solution such as the Nash bargaining solution ν (Nash, 1950) , which assigns to every S ∈ B the point ν(S) which maximizes the product Π i∈N x i over the set S. Example 5.7 Let N = {1, 2} and Ω = {1, 2}. The players have additive capacities: µ 1 (1) = µ 1 (2) = changes in the degree of risk/uncertainty aversion. We found that an increase in one's opponent's risk aversion is advantageous, and that an increase in one's opponent's uncertainty aversion is disadvantageous. Further, a less risk averse bargainer prefers his allocation to the one obtained by his more risk averse alter ego, whereas a more uncertainty averse bargainer prefers his allocation to the one obtained by his less uncertainty averse alter ego. Finally, we showed by means of examples that the effect of changes in the degree of risk/uncertainty aversion on the Nash bargaining solution is not conclusive. Since CEU generalizes SEU, it follows that the comparative risk aversion results for monotonic bargaining solutions hold for the SEU case as well. Of course, uncertainty does not play a role in the SEU model.
Our (bargaining) results are derived under the so-called welfaristic assumption: The bargaining solution depends only on the feasible set and not directly on the underlying model. Hence, these results may or may not hold if the welfaristic assumption is dropped.
As to the set of consequences in the paper, which is equal to all divisions of one unit of a perfectly divisible good, this may with some modifications be generalized to an arbitrary compact set of (riskless) alternatives, as in Köbberling and Peters (2003) . Our choice in this paper is motivated by convenience, in particular when deriving results about comprehensiveness of feasible sets. Also, if no risk is involved (that is, only uncertainty regarding the state of the world but no lotteries), the results still go through if risk aversion is interpreted as diminishing marginal utility (see Peters, 1992) .
